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Abstract 
This paper seeks to understand how professions are scrutinised, and attempt to justify themselves, in 
the light of apparent failure. We analyse the interaction between the heads of the Big Four – the four 
largest accounting firms - and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee during a recent British 
parliamentary investigation into the audit market. The paper provides an ethnomethodologically-
informed discourse analysis of the forms of mundane and professional reason through which ‘reality 
disjunctures’, that is, conflicting accounts of events, were posed and handled during these 
interactions. The reality disjunctures exposed by the Committee, we propose, serve to perform 
“holding to account” and questioning the legitimacy of the Big Four. The candidate resolutions 
proffered by the Big Four, in turn, sought to perform “accountability”, restore legitimacy and trust in 
the profession and maintain the status quo. These discursive contests, we argue, were pivotal to the 
social construction of the reality of the UK audit profession and also served to shape the future of the 
profession, including implications for governance and state regulation.  
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The ‘Big Four’ in the Spotlight: Accountability and Professional Legitimacy in the UK Audit 
Market 
  
“… in the context of the statutory audit responsibilities for 2007, auditors, we believe, discharged 
their responsibilities professionally and with care and diligence”  
(Brendan Nelson, Vice Chairman KPMG1)  
 
Introduction 
How do professions justify themselves in the light of apparent failure? More specifically, how are 
versions ‘what is wrong’ and ‘what should be done’ following a crisis in a profession discursively 
constructed? We address these questions through an analysis of the testimony of UK managing 
partners of the four major accountancy firms - the ‘Big Four’ – during a recent inquiry into the British 
audit market. This study draws on the literature on audit failure (Arruñada, 2004; Chaney & Philipich, 
2002; Jin, Kanagaretnam & Lobo, 2011; Thornburg & Roberts, 2008), discourse analysis (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Edwards, 1997), sensemaking theory (Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005) and 
ethnomethodology (Pollner, 1987; Maynard & Manzo, 1997) respectively. Our specific contribution is 
to further the understanding of professions and professional work (e.g. Drew & Heritage, 1992; 
Gunnarsson, Linell & Nordberg, 1997; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) by developing an 
ethnomethodologically-informed discourse analysis (EDA) perspective. We explore the value of this 
EDA perspective for understanding the social construction of the reality of professions – including 
questions of what role professions play in society, how they function and how they should be 
governed and regulated.  
Clearly, audit can only serve as a system for the ‘production of legitimacy’ (Power, 1997a) if 
the profession itself has legitimacy: being accepted as a reliable, independent, accurate and 
trustworthy method of “scrutiny”. Indeed, following the old ‘fiduciary logic’, professional practice in 
audit was viewed as essentially being about “building and selling legitimacy” (Thornton et al., 2005, p. 
135). Following on from Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005) analysis of the role of rhetoric in the 
creation of legitimacy during periods of institutional change in professional service firms, we seek to 
show how the legitimacy of the audit profession was reaffirmed or undermined during a public inquiry 
seeking to interrogate the performance of the Big Four auditors in the run-up to the global financial 
                                                          
1 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc144_iv/uc14402.htm. Oral 
evidence given to Treasury Committee inquiry “Banking crisis - auditors and credit rating agencies”, 29th 
January 2009. 
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crisis. We argue that the Big Four were asked to justify themselves, and more specifically account for 
their ‘performance’. In providing such an account, they were potentially producing, maintaining or 
defending their legitimacy, which – in the case of professions – relies not only upon following accepted 
social norms of conduct but also higher ideals and values such as independence, truth, fairness and 
public service (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Patriotta et al, 2011). 
The paper draws on testimony data recorded during a House of Lords inquiry into the state of 
the UK audit market. Our analysis examines the way in which senior executives of the Big Four 
attempted to legitimate the actions of their firms in the light of the questioning of their professional 
integrity, trustworthiness, competence and expertise. Our argument is that the interaction between 
the House of Lords Committee and the Heads of the Big Four were pivotal moments, whereby the 
legitimacy of the audit field was under threat. In terms of audit specifically, the accountancy profession 
has been granted a professional privilege by most countries around the world, offering them a warrant 
to practice under what are essentially oligopolistic market conditions (e.g. Abidin, Beattie & Goodacre, 
2010). The global financial crisis, and the collapse and subsequent bail-out of banks that were 
previously given a ‘green light’ by auditors, placed this warrant in question. The inquiry was thus, in 
our view, about which version of reality was established about audit’s role in the financial crisis 
specifically and their rights to privileges associated with their standing as a ‘profession’ more 
generally.   
We draw on concepts from ethnomethodology and discourse analysis to show how reality 
disjunctures – situations where people produce, or are faced with, multiple versions of the world 
(Pollner, 1987; Potter, 1996: 54-7; Edwards, 1997: 68-71) – were created and contested within the 
inquiry. Understanding these methods for recognising and resolving reality disjunctures, we suggest, 
enables us to see how the legitimacy of the profession was constructed and contested, with 
implications for potentially far-reaching changes to the accountancy profession and the Big Four 
specifically. In a similar study conducted by Maynard and Manzo (1997), they explore the discursive 
strategies, and specifically contrast procedures, employed by jury members in order to create a local 
understanding of what constitutes ‘justice’ in the face of conflicting interpretations. In our case, we 
will show how the reality disjunctures (ex)posed by the Lords served to undermine the credibility of 
the Big Four’s accounts in ways that de-legitimized the profession and bolstered the mandate for a 
change in governance. We also extend our argument by drawing on Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), 
Pentland (1993), Hajer (2009: 107-9), Alexander (2011: 68-70) and Ramirez (2013) in linking rhetorical 
micro performances to broader, meso and macro considerations regarding professional legitimacy, 
governance and regulation.  
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the production of legitimacy in a 
professional context is explained first; followed by an exploration of the role of contrast structures, 
reality disjunctures and candidate resolutions in the legitimation process. The methods section 
explains how our analysis sought to understand how the Committee questioned the legitimacy of the 
current system and how the heads of the Big Four sought to repair legitimacy and restore confidence 
in the profession. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications for the Big Four and the 
accountancy profession as a whole.       
 
Producing Professional Legitimacy: The Case of Auditors 
There has been a long-running critique, conducted primarily on the margins of the discipline, directed 
against a “reified view of accounting” practices (Roberts and Scapens, 1985: 453). In the apt 
characterization provided by Covaleski and Dirsmith (1990: 545), a reifying view of “(a)ccounting gives 
a self-evident and apparently objective way of thinking, talking and doing, cloaked behind a veil of 
blandness.” Such critique is primarily concerned with giving the lie to the notion or image of 
accounting as a mirror that neutrally and objectively records corporate information. Instead, from a 
critical or interpretive angle, the emphasis is placed on studying “accounting in action, as forms of 
situated practice” (Chua, 1988: 73; see also Tomkins & Groves, 1983a, b). The latter kind of research 
tells us what actually happens, rather than what should happen. Rather than accept accounting and 
audit as a putatively objective and interest-free enterprise, from this angle we look at “the parts played 
by legitimated knowledge experts” in the process of “account fabrication” (Chua, 1995: 115). In a later 
piece, Chua (2007: 490) reinforces the point by arguing for a “renewed concern with practice” and 
concrete “field studies” of what actually happens. This directs us not only towards studying the 
practices involved when professions interact with their clients, but also towards studying the practices 
involved in field-level contestation and change at the level of the profession as a whole – the focus of 
this paper. 
In this vein, Pentland (1993) demonstrated how auditing, by providing a form of ‘comfort’ at 
the ‘micro’ level, can fulfil a ‘macro’ function. Professionalism, institutional trust in audit practice and 
the ‘idealization’ of auditor independence are macro constructions, which are built up from and 
reproduced via the layering of many such micro interactions. Micro-rituals of interaction between 
auditors and their clients provide the progressive purification of the “mess of practice” for outside 
consumption (Power, 2003: 385). Building on Goffman and Collins, Pentland (1993) argued that to be 
an auditor, you have to convincingly act like an auditor, and put on a smooth public face. Our argument 
takes Pentland’s and Power’s arguments away from the auditor-client interface, and we transpose 
their arguments to the testimony interface within the public inquiry setting. Just like Power (2003: 
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385) rightly emphasizes “appearances and process as quality proxies” in the client interaction, we 
extend his point to the testimony interaction. As the legitimacy of the Big Four auditors has been 
questioned – inquiries are surely not held where professions are deemed to be legitimate and working 
well – then specific interactions are required to address this challenge (Patriotta et al, 2011; Ramirez, 
2013: 848). Power (2003: 392) skilfully describes how, during auditor-client interaction, a “great deal 
of work is done by agents to ensure that what is eventually done and agreed upon appears natural, 
obvious and, temporarily at least, uncontested.” We also extend this argument in proposing that the 
public (and ceremonial) display of scrutiny in the form of a public inquiry, prompted by the financial 
crisis, provides a renewed challenge for the Big Four in re-establishing legitimacy for their specific 
privileged position in society.  
 Extant literature on the global financial crisis has attempted to dissect the causes of failure in 
the global banking system (Lounsbury & Hirsch, 2010; Campbell, 2010; Casey, 2011; Stiglitz, 2010). In 
particular, there has been critical scrutiny of banker’s remuneration packages (Acharya & Richardson, 
2009), regulators such as the Financial Services Authority in the UK or the Federal Reserve Bank in the 
US and major rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (Rona-Tas & Hiss, 2010; Crotty, 
2009; Goodhart, 2008), the ideology of neo-liberalism (Campbell, 2010; Crouch, 2011) and the role of 
competition between New York and London as major financial centres (French et al, 2009; Coates & 
Dickstein, 2011). Others, such as Cassidy (2009), paint a broader picture, one in which no particular 
group is in the foreground, but rather it is a landscape capturing broad market failure in the context 
of neo-liberal deregulation of the finance sector.  
The role of accounting practices (Arnold, 2009; Power, 2011) and the Big Four accountancy 
firms that audited the banks (Sikka, 2009; Jin, Kanagaretnam & Lobo, 2011) have also come under 
scrutiny, particularly in relation to the auditing of banks which subsequently received government 
assistance to prevent their collapse. Power’s (1997b: 123; also Day and Klein, 1987: 244) observation 
that “The audit society is a society that endangers itself because it invests too heavily in shallow rituals 
of verification at the expense of other forms of organizational intelligence” must now be seen as highly 
prescient in light of recent developments. By taking its cue from Power’s “shallow rituals” indictment, 
this paper’s main research question relates to the analysis of the methods used by the Big Four in 
accounting for and justifying their role in the financial crisis, along with wider concerns of the lack of 
independence and lack of competition in the audit market. In line with Boltanski and Thévenot (2006), 
we also seek to understand how justifications relate to ‘orders of worth’ not in abstract terms, but 
through examining how they play out in specific situations2. Following Ramirez (2013: 854), we “use 
                                                          
2 Legitimacy, justifications and orders of worth are connected in this setting as follows: First, the legitimacy of 
the UK audit market was questioned in and through the act of holding an enquiry – clearly, professions that 
are perceived as legitimate do not get called to an enquiry and are permitted to continue “business as usual”. 
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archetypal situations for the sake of demonstration”. By focusing on some carefully chosen situations 
of justifications we seek to demonstrate a broader argument about the role of methods of holding to 
account, methods of justification and their respective consequences for professional legitimacy, which 
will be outlined in the discussion and conclusion.  
It is our central contention that the parliamentary inquiry we analyse represents a significant 
site in which professional mandates and jurisdictions were negotiated (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2010) found that three factors influenced the decision by government whether to 
appoint an inquiry: the politics of blame, a public agenda and government popularity. Taking this a 
step further, for critical management scholars, public inquiries amount to nothing more than a 
‘smokescreen’: a veneer of accountability that enables the established power relations and lines of 
influence between business and politics to remain untouched (Engelen, et al 2011; Froud et al., 2012). 
Our approach views inquiries as neither essentially ‘smokescreens’, nor neutral democratic 
mechanisms for the achievement of public representation and accountability. Rather, following on 
from Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), we focus the analytical lens on the discursive practices 
employed to render questioned conduct legitimate or illegitimate. For this purpose, we ask: what are 
the discursive methods used to produce and make sense of accounts, i.e. testimonial evidence, when 
professional legitimacy is at stake? In the next section, we outline our theoretical approach. 
 
Reality Disjunctures: An Ethnomethodologically-informed Discourse Analysis Perspective 
Ethnomethodological studies of courtroom interaction (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Pollner, 1987), jury 
settings (Maynard & Manzo, 1997) and testimonies at public inquiries (Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Gephart, 
1993) provide important insights into the methods through which versions of reality – and their 
subsequent translation into “facts” - are assembled. Our theoretical perspective seeks to link these 
insights from ethnomethodology into the social construction of facts – what Garfinkel (1967: 79) called 
‘fact production in flight’ – with insights from discourse analysis (Potter, 1996) in what we call 
Ethnomethodologically-informed Discourse Analysis (or EDA for short). The aim of EDA is not to 
adjudicate between different versions of reality, but to uncover the procedures (or ‘ethno-methods’) 
                                                          
Second, within the setting of an enquiry, key institutional actors are called upon to justify their actions and 
justify the current status quo: justifications used not only for ‘face saving’ but also to mitigate against the 
possibility of state intervention. These justifications may, or may not, draw upon or appeal to broader social 
values or orders of worth: what is deemed ‘worthy’ (or an ‘ideal’) within the society in question. What we add 
to these existing theoretical concepts is the understanding of how the Big Four use not only justifications 
drawing on orders of worth, but also put forward candidate resolutions for resolving reality disjunctures – 
concepts we develop from Pollner (1987) – where those disjunctures were exposed in order to “hold them to 
account”. In so doing, we reveal the forms of mundane and professional reason that are deployed by the Big 
Four to explain, justify or excuse their apparent failure.    
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through which versions are produced as the authoritative or more credible ones3. For example, by 
identifying inconsistencies, an actor can “cast doubt on the credibility of the speaker” (Potter, 1996: 
118), thereby undermining their version of reality and bolstering one’s own. The version that has 
fewest of these apparent errors, inconsistencies or implausibilities is the one that, for all practical 
purposes, is accepted as constituting ‘fact’ within institutional settings.  
Gephart’s (1993) ethnomethodological study focussed on the sensemaking processes during 
a public hearing conducted in 1985 by the Canadian federal government energy board following a 
1985 pipeline accident. Gephart argued that different, or even contradictory versions, of the same 
event can initially co-exist. The task of institutions such as inquiries, then, is to sort through these 
competing versions in order to construct a single definitive version of events. Our study extends this 
perspective further by showing how discursive challenges during key events such as public inquiries 
have the potential to undermine or defend the legitimacy of a profession. Each cross-examiner, in our 
case the Committee members, builds “his or her case, step by step, in interaction with witnesses, 
through a series of questions and answers about specific facts of the case” (Heritage & Clayman, 2010: 
176). Credible and convincing versions of reality are thus built incrementally, under constant challenge 
by alternatives.  
What, then, is a reality disjuncture? The term reality disjuncture is used by the 
ethnomethodologist Melvin Pollner (1975; 1987) to describe the existence of contradictory versions 
of reality, which pose a ‘puzzle’ for the mundane assumption that the world is a perceptually or 
cognitively shared domain of objects and events ‘out there’ that exist independently of subjective 
idiosyncrasies. ‘Mundane reason’ – our common-sense everyday knowledge of the world – holds that 
there can only be one reality. Therefore, methods are clearly needed to establish what that reality is 
in the face of conflicting accounts (Pollner, 1984). Dealing effectively with reality disjunctures is 
particularly important for the accomplishment of public hearings and inquiries because, like in judicial 
settings, the institutional role of inquiries is to provide one official, accredited and ‘authoritative’ 
version of reality (Brown, 2000; 2004). Whilst society can easily accommodate a pluralism of ‘versions’ 
in many areas of endeavour, in professional arenas such as law, audit or medicine, only one official 
version of reality can be permitted – a single jury verdict, a single audit judgement or a single medical 
diagnosis. Alternative versions will only be tolerated in the form of private and personal opinions, but 
they do not, and cannot, enter the official version. Where such competing versions exist, the 
institutional role of the judge, or questioners, is to resolve these disjunctures, i.e. decide which version 
is “what really happened” or “what really is the case”.  
                                                          
3  In Silverman’s (2014: Ch.1, Ch.5) scheme, we are operating within a constructionist, not positivist or 
naturalistic research model.  
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In order to accomplish this ‘resolution’ of the disjuncture(s), candidate resolutions therefore 
need to be put forward and considered in this reasoning process. How, then, are reality disjunctures 
handled in mundane forms of reasoning? Pollner (1987) identifies some common candidate 
resolutions for resolving competing accounts. Conflicting accounts can be undermined, to bolster the 
credibility of the preferred version, by reference to things such as: 
(a) defective sensory apparatus (such as poor vision or hearing),  
(b) distortive psychological mechanisms (such as hallucination, imagination, wishful thinking), 
(c) atypical methods of reporting (such as lying, joking, metaphor, spin).  
However, simply offering a candidate resolution “does not assure a consensual resolution of 
reality disjunctures” (Pollner, 1987: 69). Rather, the job of the analyst is to study how different 
candidate resolutions are handled in specific institutional settings – in our case an inquiry into a 
profession. For example, Gephart (1984) explores the way in which an official inquiry into an 
environmental disaster handled the reality disjunctures that were generated by competing versions 
of the event by different witnesses, highlighting in particular the politics inherent in the process 
through which certain versions get ratified as the ‘official’ or ‘authoritative’ version. Thus, the task is 
not to adjudicate on whether the official version is correct or not. Rather, the task is to study the social 
and organizational processes through which versions become stabilised and legitimated as ‘truth’. 
 The concept of reality disjunctures can also be traced back to Perelman and Olbrechts‐Tyteca’s 
(1969: §90) discussion of the ‘appearance-reality’ dissociation: “While appearances can be opposed 
to each other, reality is coherent: the effect of determining reality is to dissociate those appearances 
that are deceptive from those that correspond to reality.” (p.416) They continued: “It enables those 
that do not correspond to the rule which reality provides to be termed illusory, erroneous, or apparent 
(in the depreciatory sense of this word).” (ibid) A contrast structure is a common linguistic method for 
identifying reality disjunctures, by highlighting the contrast between two opposing states, ideas or 
arguments in narratives or accounts (Smith, 1978; Potter, 1996: 194-5). Contrast structures are well 
documented in the field of rhetoric as a key method for producing persuasive speech (Potter, 1996). 
They are also routine features of the so-called ‘witcraft’ of justifying a position and handling potential 
counter-arguments (Billig, 1996). Importantly for our purposes, they also enable speakers to juxtapose 
two apparently contradictory states in order to highlight a ‘puzzle’, or what Perelman and Olbrechts‐
Tyteca (1969: 419) call “the problem that is raised by the incompatibility of appearances.” Our aim 
here is to show how contrast structures are employed as the very “machinery” of truth-generation, 
because they help to expose contradictions and thereby facilitate the generation of an agreed upon 
set of ‘facts’, which ultimately is the central business and raison d'être of institutional settings such as 
courtrooms and enquiries.  
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 For EDA, the analyst does not play the role of judge – one does not ‘argue with the members’ 
– whether by “siding” with one party to a dispute, or rejecting their versions in favour of your own 
preferred version of reality (Gubrium & Holstein, 2012). The EDA analyst is instead interested in “how 
social realities are produced, assembled, and maintained” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2008: 374-5). EDA 
does not seek to adjudicate which is the ‘correct’ reality. As for Suchman (1987: 57), the project is not 
to establish “whether social facts are objectively grounded, but how that objective grounding is 
accomplished”. The “facts” we are concerned with in this paper relate to the conduct, governance and 
legitimacy of a particular profession – more specifically, the audit function of the accounting 
profession. For the members of the Inquiry Committee we analyse, a single version of reality is not 
only desirable but necessary – it is the pre-requisite for making decisions and recommendations, 
whether that is decisions about whether to convict or acquit a defendant in the case of a courtroom, 
or recommendations about new forms of regulation or state intervention in the case of a public 
inquiry. Such decisions, of course, have serious consequences for those involved: these are therefore 
highly consequential methods of producing or withdrawing legitimacy. 
 
Research Design  
Background Context 
Our study analyses the cross-examination of the leaders of the Big Four in the UK as part of the House 
of Lords Economic Affairs Committee (hereafter simply the Committee) investigation into the UK Audit 
market4. The period in which the Lords inquiry took place is perhaps significant for understanding the 
data we draw upon. It followed a ‘bonfire of trust’ in many parts of the British establishment, involving 
scandals regarding parliamentary expenses, a meltdown in the banking sector, and a phone hacking 
scandal in the media (Kramer & Pittinsky, 2012).  
The House of Lords is the upper chamber of the UK’s bicameral system. The Lords cannot, by 
themselves, pass legislation. The Lords debate and vote on legislation that has been passed by the 
House of Commons, the ‘lower house’. They effectively share the task of law-making with the 
Commons and also share the task of holding to account the work of Government. In addition, the 
Lords also have a number of specialist committees that produce reports and recommendations into 
what are deemed to be salient contemporary issues of public policy that require in-depth 
consideration. For instance, some recent reports from the House of Lords have included ‘Banking 
Supervision and Regulation’, ‘Economics of Renewable Energy’, and the ‘Economic Impact of 
Immigration’. Members of the Committee have in the course of their previous careers typically held 
senior government, political or commercial positions and possess high levels of knowledge about 
                                                          
4 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/11902.htm 
The ‘Big Four’ in the Spotlight 
 11 
economic and financial issues. They are, in short, senior members of the financial, industry and 
political establishment in the UK. 
In outlining the rationale for the Audit Inquiry during a press conference, Lord McGregor made 
a number of remarks that are noteworthy for our analysis. McGregor’s account both establishes the 
problematization of the audit market (‘dominated by a very small number of players’) and frames the 
nature of the proposed ‘solution’ (‘promoting more competition’). He emphasised the issue of 
whether auditing failed to pick up on ‘unsustainable risks’ being accumulated by the banking sector in 
the run up to the crash. The aim of the report emanating from the inquiry, he concludes, is to provide 
‘better services to business and investors’5. The Committee invited evidence to be submitted by the 
27th of September 2010. More specifically, the Committee asked for submissions that related to the 
following questions:  
 
 “How has auditing come to be dominated by four global firms? Should more 
competition be introduced? And if so how? 
 Does a lack of competition lead to excessive fees being charged? 
 Were auditors sufficiently sceptical when auditing banks in the run up to the financial 
crises in 2008? Could they have done anything to mitigate the crises? Can auditors 
now contribute to better regulation of banks? 
 Do conflicts of interest arise between audit and consultancy roles? How can these be 
avoided or mitigated?  
 Should the role of internal auditors be enhanced and how should they interact with 
external auditors?”6 
 
While our paper focuses exclusively on the hearing conducted on the 23rd November 2010, 
where the UK Heads of the Big Four gave their testimony to the Committee, our knowledge of the 
other hearings and written submissions also informed our analysis.7 As can be seen, there existed 
                                                          
5  The final report is available here:  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/119.pdf 
[our overview of this final report has not been included due to space constraints].  
6 Twenty one written submissions were made to the inquiry, ranging from letters from private citizens, academics, accounting and 
investment firms and other stakeholders. The Committee convened for hearings on ten occasions, interviewing: accountancy academics 
(12/10/2010), the UK professional accountancy institutes (19/10/2010), management consultants (26/10/2010), medium sized accountancy 
firms (2/11/2010), State bodies such as the Office of Fair Trading, the Financial Reporting Council and the Financial Services Authority 
(9/11/2010), the Heads of the Big Four in the UK (23/11/ 2010), Finance directors including representatives of the ‘Hundred Group of Finance 
Directors’ (7/12/2010), the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (14/12/2010), Insurance Companies (11/1/2011), representatives from 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (18/1/2011), and current Government Ministers 
(25/1/2011). In total the Committee asked 553 questions, which were transcribed and made publicly available on the House of Lords website. 
The sessions were also broadcast live in the UK on Parliament TV. The Committee published their final report on 30th March 2011.  While 
the recommendations of a House of Lords report are not legally binding, they are invested with considerable symbolic and political power.  
7 The transcripts of all the hearings are publicly available at the following website: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/ lords-select/economic-affairs-committee/inquiries/auditors-market-
concentration-and-their-role/. A summary overview of the other hearings is provided here: 
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several points of consensus and disagreement between the various hearings around the causes of 
‘audit failure’, with some representatives also seeking to question the notion that a ‘failure’ had 
indeed taken place. Indeed, it was the narrative of ‘failure’ that comprised much of the debate in the 
Big Four testimony that we analyse here. It is noteworthy that prior to this meeting, a number of 
strong critiques of the Big Four had been made by other witnesses.  
For our purposes, the hearing data is particularly suitable as it is ‘naturally occurring talk’ (e.g. 
Silverman, 2014: Ch.11) between members of the Committee and Heads of the Big Four – that is, data 
that is not staged for purposes of the researcher, albeit ‘staged’ in the sense of being a highly ritualised 
public setting (Kertzer, 1988: 107-110). Naturally occurring talk is particularly suitable for the type of 
discourse analysis we undertake here, because such talk potentially enables us to study fact-making 
‘in flight’, namely in settings where these facts will go on to inform decisions and actions that are 
consequential for practical matters at hand of those involved (see also Tomkins & Groves, 1983a, b) - 
unlike, say, interviews or questionnaires where the ‘facts’ being assembled are primarily 
consequential for the researcher’s own agenda (Silverman, 2014: Ch.7). Of course, we acknowledge 
that the representatives of the Big Four almost certainly engaged in extensive preparation for their 
appearance at the House of Lords, which undoubtedly involved media training and PR advice, and 
perhaps even collective strategies for dealing with questions. Still, the performance must not appear 
overly scripted, as authenticity needs to be at least performed and projected: in Alexander’s (2011: 
72) words, even “an artfully contrived performance (must) seem honest and real … ”. 
    
Research analytics 
The analysis was conducted as follows. Each of the three authors independently read the publicly 
available transcript of the testimony given by the senior UK partners of the Big Four on the 23rd 
November 2010, which comprised of 55 questions and was 15,800 words in length, noting in particular 
the discourse used by both questioners (Lords) and respondents (Big Four) alike. We were guided by 
the insights from courtroom, public inquiry and jury deliberation studies in particular (e.g. Atkinson & 
Drew, 1979; Pollner, 1987; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Maynard & Manzo, 1997; Hajer, 2009: Ch.3) into 
how competing versions of reality are posed and handled in judicial and quasi-judicial settings. We 
were also guided by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005: 42), for whom the “data thus capture the 
arguments used by key actors engaged in a legitimacy contest over institutional logics”. Our 
expectation that the questioners (Committee members) and respondents (Big Four representatives) 
                                                          
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldeconaf/119/119.pdf 
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would produce different versions of “what happened” and “why” in the run-up to the financial crisis 
was borne out by the empirical data. Hence, we focused our analysis on those sections of the 
transcript where different versions of reality (‘disjunctures’) were identified, problematised and 
handled by the participants. Following our independent analyses of the transcript we met and spent 
further time reading the data to identify all the stretches of interaction where ‘reality disjunctures’ 
were present. We have organized our analysis around the various methods or procedures used to 
handle these disjunctures, which inductively we came to term ‘factual’, ‘temporal’ and ‘theoretical’.  
 
Reality Disjunctures and the Audit Profession 
Contrast structures operate in this setting by calling into question previous accounts provided by the 
Big Four in order to expose reality disjunctures – the contrast between, say, their claims that the 
industry is competitive or performed well in the auditing of banks and evidence to the contrary. In 
what follows, we analyse selected examples of contrast structures that served to undermine the 
credibility of the Big Four’s accounts and, thereby, posed questions about the legitimacy of the 
profession. Table 1 provides a summary of the contrast structures posed by the questioners and the 
various resolutions put forward by the Big Four representatives across the following four major points 
of contestation during the inquiry8: 
 
 The conflict of interest involved in providing tax advisory services to audit clients; 
 The auditing of banks, which were given an unqualified audit opinion and subsequently 
received a state bail-out to avoid bankruptcy; 
 Lack of competitiveness in the audit market. 
 Failure to alert authorities and regulators about the risks posed to the British economy by 
the leverage, liquidity and lending practices of the banks that were audited; 
 
----Insert Table 1 here---- 
 
In the analysis that follows, we will analyse the four selected extracts summarised in Table 1 in order 
to illustrate the operation of the contrast structures, reality disjunctures and candidate resolutions. 
 
                                                          
8 Given our interest here in reality disjunctures created by competing accounts, we have chosen not to 
examine the points of agreement during the hearing. These four points of disagreement were also the main 
points of criticism of the Big Four in the Committee’s final report, which formed the basis of their 
recommendation for referral to the Office of Fair Trading and then the Competition Commission (as it was 
then called). 
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Disjuncture 1: Conflict of interests 
 
 
In Lord Hollick’s question, he takes issue with the notion that commercial interests do not interfere 
with their professional judgement as auditors. The contrast structure is as follows: 
(i) Given X [that your firms provide advisory services on taxation and tax planning];  
(ii) We would expect Y [that the same accounting firm would not conduct the audit given the 
conflict of interest]; 
(iii)  How you can account for Z [the fact that your firm also audits the same companies it 
offers these services to]?  
 
Lord Hollick formulates the disjuncture based upon the assumption that different groups from the 
same firm are, or have been, involved in simultaneously offering advisory services and undertaking 
audit work. Powell attempts to resolve the disjuncture by disputing whether this fact actually exists: 
what we can call the ‘factual method’. Powell claims that this ‘fact’ is actually ‘fiction’: this 
circumstance has never actually occurred because they would not be allowed (by their independence 
rules and the client firm’s audit committees), or allow themselves (through notions of 
professionalism), to be in this situation. The ‘problem’ itself (conflict of interest) is accepted as a 
theoretical possibility, but not an empirical reality. The factual method is also deployed in other 
responses: for instance, through the assertion in response to Q240 that “no, we did not make that 
threat [to withdraw from the audit market]”. In this case the disjuncture is dismissed as thus: there is 
no disjuncture, because the situation you refer to has never actually happened.  
This was one version of reality, but it was not necessarily strong enough to be widely accepted. 
In a different hearing, one of the academic experts (Power, 12 Oct 2010) provides a different 
resolution of the supposed ‘conflict’ between offering both audit and advisory services. Here the 
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expert witness, Professor Michael Power, downplays the severity of this conflict: “There are a lot of 
synergies and benefits between advisory work and auditing. I am sorry that so much attention has 
been given to this particular issue because it detracts from the really important issue, that of audit 
quality.” (Q6) This offers a theoretical resolution of the disjuncture, problematizing the very theory of 
‘conflict of interests’ underlying the question. In another testimony, Hayward (Independent Audit, 26 
Oct 2010: p.24) distinguishes two ways of doing an audit and argues that under one type, “the right 
first time sort, then doing advisory work can improve the auditor’s ability to do it, because he has a 
better understanding of the business and of the motivations and pressures of management.” Again, 
here different theories of audit are put forward to offer candidate resolutions to the ‘conflict of 
interest’ disjuncture. 
Different ways of resolving the disjuncture would, in all likelihood, have different implications. 
For example, the factual resolution put forward by the Big Four points to little need for additional 
regulation (because the conflict of interest ‘never happens’), whereas the theoretical resolution put 
forward by the academic experts points to the need for greater regulation of audit work (to ensure it 
is ‘right first time’) coupled with less regulation of advisory work (which is presented as ‘synergistic’).  
 
Disjuncture 2: The going concern judgement 
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Lord Lipsey begins his question by drawing a parallel between the previous responses by the Big Four 
and the children’s fantasy Alice in Wonderland, thus setting up the scepticism of his question. The 
invocation of Alice in Wonderland is perhaps indicative of the surreal quality Lipsey ascribed to some 
of the statements made by the Big Four. This is quickly followed by his self-categorisation as a ‘naïve 
amateur’: perhaps an ironic remark to preface his more ‘expert’ scrutiny, but also one that fits with 
his role as political representative of the ‘general public’. Lipsey then uses a contrast structure and, 
through this device, the questioner problematizes the validity of the Big Four’s previous account, 
namely whether they actually ‘performed well in the auditing of the banks’. The audience is invited to 
be sceptical with regard to their version of events: if the banks were judged by auditors to be able to 
repay their debts, why did they need state assistance in doing exactly that? The reality disjuncture is 
thus: either the banks had sufficient liquidity to be a ‘going concern’ or they did not – it cannot be 
both.  
In response, Powell employs a temporal resolution to the disjuncture. For him, the objects to 
which the two accounts refer – the ‘going concern’ audit opinion – are not the same objects. One is 
the opinion now post-crisis and with-the-benefit-of-hindsight, and the object to which he is referring 
was then, pre-crisis. Reference to the setting of the audit report “before the financial crisis” 
undertakes the work of resolving the disjuncture: while the banks could not be considered a going 
concern during the crisis or post crisis, it was reasonable to consider them a going concern back then 
before the crisis. The temporal method is in fact deployed on other occasions where the answer is 
given with specific date references to ‘the year ended 31 December 2006’ (response to Q267), ‘31 
December 2007’ (response to Q275) and ‘31 December 2006’ (response to Q280).  
Other ‘experts’ provided a different resolution to the disjuncture: one expert pointed to the 
‘Companies Act’ regulatory regime, which had existed before the events under scrutiny, under which 
audit firms adopted prudence and substance over form, whereas under the subsequent regulatory 
regime, the audit firms will play safe and simply follow the rules, cautious of being sued: “This is the 
problem with the ‘true and fair’ view and the ‘substance over form’ concepts going.” (12 Oct 2010, 
Prof Beattie, response to Q30) The academic expert here provides not a temporal but a theoretical 
resolution to the disjuncture – the theory of audit built into professional standards, such as IFRS. Again, 
these different methods for resolving reality disjunctures point to different ‘causes’ of the audit 
‘failure’ and different ‘solutions’ to it: they are thus consequential. The temporal resolution put 
forward by the Big Four points to little need for additional regulation, because auditors can never 
predict the future, and should not reasonably be expected to be fortune tellers. The theoretical 
resolution put forward by the academic experts, on the other hand, points to the need for greater 
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legislative protection and regulation of audit work, or indeed a re-definition of what audit is through 
a revision of the professional standards. 
 
Disjuncture 3: Market competitiveness 
 
 
Here Lord Forsyth scrutinises the testimony of the Big Four, particularly their claim that the audit field 
is already highly competitive. In so doing, doubt is cast upon the idea that the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
professional services market is operating adequately. The reality disjuncture is thus: either the market 
is competitive [the Big Four’s claim] or it is not [Lord Forsyth’s claim]: it cannot be both. Hence, the 
Big Four must find a way of resolving this ‘puzzle’.  
Griffith-Jones attempts to resolve the reality disjuncture by re-interpreting the ‘evidence’ 
used in the question. He disputes not the evidence itself (although this is indeed one way of resolving 
competing accounts – see Lynch, 1998), but rather what the evidence tells us about levels of 
competition. Griffith-Jones claims that low switching rates are not, in fact, evidence of a lack of 
competition. He claims that the audit market is competitive (validating their original version). Low 
switching rates, he claims, arise because clients are choosing not to exercise the option of tendering – 
either because the auditor resolves any problems before it goes to tender, or because the audit team 
is itself rotated frequently, thereby building ‘churn’ into the system already. The candidate solution 
offered to resolve the disjuncture is differing theories of competition. According to the Big 4, long-
lasting relations between buyer and supplier need not indicate the absence of ‘competition’. Rather, 
the ‘fact’ that switching rates are low (Q242), and that competitive tenders are so infrequent among 
The ‘Big Four’ in the Spotlight 
 18 
the FTSE100 companies (Q243), suggests that industry concentration is actually the result of market 
choice (Q244, 245). The Big Four seem to suggest that actual switching or tendering is not essential 
for a competitive market to exist; the mere option of being able to switch already constitutes a 
competitive market (response to Q243-6).  
In this example, the ‘facts’ of the evidence are not disputed, but rather what those facts 
themselves indicate about the abstract, theoretical concept known as ‘competition’. The theory of 
‘competition’, then, is re-defined from being about ‘high levels of switching’ to having ‘the choice to 
switch’. It is worth pointing out that there was a corresponding disagreement during the academic 
expert testimony (12 Oct 2010). Whilst Prof Power agreed with the questioner (Lord Best, Q11) that a 
low rate of switching (turnover) is indeed evidence of an ’uncompetitive’ market, Prof Beattie 
(response to Q11) disagreed with both Lord Best and Prof Power by arguing that a low switching rate 
was not indicative of a lack of competition. Other parties, namely small and medium-sized audit firms, 
also expressed concern at the level of concentration with the attendant risk of systemic failure in the 
market (02 Nov 2010, Mr Michaels, p.2) – albeit with onlookers presumably thinking “they would say 
that wouldn’t they” (Potter, 1996), given they would understandably want a ‘slice of the pie’ for 
themselves. Indeed, Mr Herbinet of Mazars LLP, the 8th largest UK accountancy firm, pointed out that 
among the FTSE100 only 0.1% of audit fees was not earned by the Big Four (02 Nov 2010, Mr Herbinet, 
p.8). Thus, theories of what constitutes ‘competition’ were both ‘at play’ and ‘at stake’ here.  
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Disjuncture 4: Sounding Alarm Bells
 
The contrast structure in Q274 enables Lord Forsyth to cast doubt upon the claim of the Big Four 
auditors that they performed well in auditing the banks which subsequently received a government 
‘bail-out’ to avert bankruptcy. In so doing, doubt is also being cast upon the trust that society has in 
the profession – more specifically, trust that audit enables investors and the wider public to evaluate 
the true financial state of firms (c.f. Power, 1997b: Ch.6). The reality disjuncture is thus: either the 
audit opinion on the banks was correct [they were solvent and no alarm bells needed sounding] or 
incorrect [they were not solvent and alarm bells did need sounding]: it cannot be both. Hence, the Big 
Four must find a way of resolving this ‘puzzle’. The initial response by Griffith-Jones draws on the 
temporal method already discussed above. The term ‘hindsight’ suggests that judgements now need 
to be treated as a different object-referent to judgements back then. Griffith-Jones implies that while 
he would agree a “going concern” audit opinion would be regarded as erroneous in 2010 (the year of 
the inquiry), it was not erroneous in 2007-8, because information available now was not available 
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then. The disjuncture is handled through the creation of two different referents: audit-opinion-now-
with-hindsight and audit-opinion-then-without-hindsight.  
In his second response, however, Griffith-Jones attempts to resolve the disjuncture in a 
different way, by putting forward another alternative referent – a different theory of what ‘audit’ is. 
The disjuncture is caused, he implies, by them talking about different things. Griffith-Jones claims that 
Lord Forsyth’s question was premised on the theory that audit is a particular type of ‘thing’, namely: 
audit-as-forecast-of-profits, audit-as-risk-assessment, and audit-as-judgement-on-business-model. 
Griffith-Jones instead proposes a different referent: the audit-as-look-back-exercise. Griffith-Jones is 
thus able to agree with the premise of the question – it would be a neglect of audit to fail to sound 
alarm bells if ‘audit is to assess business models’ – while rejecting the notion that the criticism applies 
to his preferred theory, the ‘audit-as-a-look-back-exercise’. This enables the Big Four to deflect, albeit 
not conclusively, the implication that they somehow ‘failed’ in the auditing of the banks. Throughout 
the transcript, the theoretical method is deployed in relation to theory of competition (Q242), theory 
of market choice (Q243, Q244, Q245, Q251), theory of what constitutes a ‘going concern’ (Q264, 
Q265, Q266, Q278, Q280), theory of accounting as a looking backward or forward exercise (Q274, 
Q276, Q278), and theory of accounting as a prudent judgement or a ‘tick box’ approach (Q286). 
How does this candidate resolution square with other hearings? In the testimony of 
representatives of the consulting industry (26 Oct 2010) it was argued that IFRS “doesn’t allow you to 
take a forward assessment of risk” (Mr Timothy Bush, fund manager and prior chair of the ICAEW 
Competition and Choice working group). This is connected with a point about the “international model 
that is potentially a race to the bottom” and is indicative of a more general “loss of prudence in 
accounting standards” (ibid). The other side of the coin is, however, the argument that the Big Four 
have massively benefitted from developments over the last 15 years or so and there is now an 
automatic assumption that “big is best”, coupled with the “perception that the Big Four are better 
placed” to conduct an audit for an FTSE listed company (26 Oct 2010, Mr Bush and Dr Niels). It is worth 
pointing out that among the academic expert testimonies (12 Oct 2010), there was some degree of 
disagreement: one expert would have wished, once they recognised the risk on the balance sheets, to 
have stuck “their heads over the parapet and say […] “Hey, there’s something wrong here”” (Prof 
Fearnley, response to Q31); another academic expert points out that “mechanisms for making a public 
statement in the area that you’re mentioning just didn’t exist” (Prof Power, response to Q31). Power’s 
testimony is very much in line with his academic work where he has often emphasized that “a public 
critique in the form of a qualified audit report tends to be a last resort.” (1997: 125) 
What we call the “theoretical method” is, we suggest, a particular form of reasoning that is 
specific to forms of expert or professional knowledge. Defendants in a traffic court, for instance, rarely 
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attempt to put forward an alternative theory of ‘speed’ in order to accredit their version of events and 
discredit alternative versions (Pollner, 1987). For lay people the theoretical method is not a 
commonplace method of reasoning. However, courtrooms – like public inquiries - are replete with 
forms of expert reason. Prosecution often rests on the production of ‘evidence’ that is founded on 
theories of, say, chemical testing or DNA profiling. In fact, as Lynch (1998) has shown, lawyers are 
skilled at questioning the very foundations of ‘expert’ and ‘professional’ concepts and theories that 
comprise the ‘evidence’ of the courtroom. Our analysis suggests that theoretical resolutions play a 
crucial role in the re-legitimation strategies of professions in particular. As we will discuss next, these 
competing theories also have consequences for institutional change in the profession. 
 
Discussion  
In this study, notions of professionalism, competition and common-sense explanations of competing 
accounts played key roles in creating an overall narrative of a dysfunctional audit market, which 
potentially contributed - according to the Committee at least - to the global financial crisis. We have 
shown how contrast structures were employed by the Committee in order to display scepticism 
towards the accounts produced by the Big Four, by exposing the ‘reality disjunctures’ (Pollner, 1987), 
or “certain incompatibilities between appearances” (Perelman & Olbrechts‐Tyteca, 1969: §90). A 
contrast structure immediately opens up a division and a moral order: between what you say you did 
and what you did, what you say happened and what we know actually happened, how things ought 
to be and how they are. For us, these methods enable the performance of moral accountability: 
holding others to account according to some moral order, including duty, obligation, and responsibility 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).  
Such holding-to-account is especially important for professions, as it is one method to ensure 
that professions live up to, or at least approximate, the idealizations of professional work (Ezzamel et 
al, 2007; Greenwood, 1957). In the case of audit, this idealization implies that audit is performed to a 
high standard of competence and integrity, in the service of public interest. These ideals also benefit 
the firms themselves. Indeed, firms are known to pay more for supposedly more “reputable” auditors 
in scenarios like Initial Public Offerings (Chaney & Philipich, 2002: 1244). Blatant audit failures 
therefore need to be seen to be investigated thoroughly, lest public confidence in audit erodes and its 
very raison d’etre thereby evaporates: why have an audit if the evaluation either cannot be believed 
or is of little value? Failure in professions are likely to be scrutinized in ways that other occupations 
may not be because of their particular privileges, such as limits to free and open competition, which 
are granted on the basis that they uphold treasured values, such as truth, public service, justice or 
health. Indeed, in this study, the questioners specifically thematized these privileges and the claim 
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that the audit profession upholds the values of truth, fairness and transparency and their overall 
dedication to the public good – including the stability of the entire financial system in this case. 
‘Regular’ occupations presumably would not be held to account with regard to similar privileges or 
values – a firm that does poor quality work or places profit above public service does not typically 
prompt a parliamentary investigation. In this way, our paper sheds light on how, at crucial moments, 
professions handle contestation regarding their professional privileges.  
We propose that the discursive methods used to pose and handle reality disjunctures are 
important because they do the work of building, or undermining, the credibility of the versions of 
reality put forward by the representatives of the profession. A reality disjuncture that was not deemed 
to be adequately resolved might, arguably, create pressure for political, regulatory and legislative 
actions. Hence, the very act of exposing a reality disjuncture, we propose, does the work of 
undermining the accounts put forward by the profession. Our focus therefore is less on describing ‘the 
world’ but more on “worlding, the work whereby a world per se and the attendant concerns which 
derive from a world per se … are constructed and sustained” (Pollner, 1987: 7, emphasis added). From 
the responses by the heads of the Big Four in this study, we identified three principal methods through 
which these disjunctures are handled and ‘candidate resolutions’ are put forward: namely, the factual, 
temporal and theoretical methods. Whilst the former two methods resonate with the ‘mundane 
reasoning’ methods documented by others (Pollner, 1987; Gephart, 1984), the ‘theoretical’ method 
employed by the Big Four, alongside other academic ‘experts’, is of particular interest to us here.9 It 
represented a form of more ‘expertly grounded reasoning’ that is a central part of any professional or 
expert system, such as accounting. The theoretical method enabled the profession to put forward 
alternative understandings of the underlying ‘theory’ of competition, audit judgement, auditor 
independence and conflicts of interests. These issues have indeed for a long time potentially blighted 
the legitimacy of the accountancy profession (Windsor & Warming-Rasmussen, 2009; Thornburg & 
Roberts, 2008; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Moore et al, 2006; Sikka et al, 1989). So, how should we 
make sense of a theoretical disagreement? 
We argue that theoretical disjunctures are related to underlying ideological dilemmas. This 
means that disjunctures which occurred with regard to things like competition, market choice, ‘going 
concern’, accounting (as a looking backward or forward exercise), and accounting as a prudent 
judgement or a ‘tick box’ approach, expressed deeper dilemmatic ambiguities residing within both 
neo-liberal ideology (with its ideals of free competition and market choice) and the ideology of 
professions (such its ideals of higher values or standards). Following Billig (1988), we propose that 
                                                          
9 However, we are not proposing that it is always easy to draw a sharp dividing line between expert and 
mundane reasoning. Indeed, ‘experts’ invariably draw upon their common-sense reasoning and laypersons 
may also have knowledge of more expert methods of making sense. 
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each of these theoretical concepts are rooted in underlying ideologies which contain ambiguous (and 
to some extent even contradictory) elements: market choice, for example, can mean producers being 
unhindered by unnecessary regulations or it can mean consumers having a realistic chance to 
evaluate, and then choose, between what is on offer – even if they ultimately choose not to switch to 
a competitor. The debate between the Committee and the Big Four was therefore played out through 
these conflicting versions of what it means to have a ‘competitive’ market, to sign off a set of accounts 
as a ‘going concern’ or avoid a ‘conflict of interest’.  
Our study also has important connections with Boltanski and Thévenot’s (2006) notion of 
“orders of worth”, which refers to the higher order principles that actors appeal to when questions 
are raised about the correctness or justness of a particular social arrangement10. As it happens, 
professions have long been known to define their legitimacy by “attaching their expertise to values 
with general cultural legitimacy” (Abbott, 1988: 16), such as science, objectivity, rationality or ‘public 
good’. For Friedson (2001: 122), it is this claim of “devotion to a transcendent value”, which positions 
the professions as ‘above’ the commercial logic of profit maximisation, that provides the underlying 
rationale for the State conferring privileges such as control over the right to practice, monopoly (or 
oligopoly) status and control over the body of knowledge. This notion of orders of worth, then, implies 
that “competent actors can engage discursively, and even strategically, with available orders of worth 
to justify their position and achieve legitimacy” (Ramirez, 2013: 848). However, during times of 
apparent failure, it is likely that these justifications will be challenges and tested. For Patriotta et al. 
(2011: 1805), “(t)ests of worth comprise both discursive and material moves and provide the basis for 
assessing the strength of public arguments according to a given order of worth.”  
The most obvious contest in our study was between notions of profit maximization associated 
with the ‘market logic’ and notions of professionalism associated with what could be called a 
‘professional logic’. The Big Four’s claim to maintain their “privileges” (Friedson, 2001: 122) depended 
on their ability to convince the Committee – and others - that the professional order of worth was 
being upheld by the Big Four and also superseded any commercial order of worth. For instance, the 
Big Four needed to persuade key audiences (such as this Committee or the competition regulator that 
undertook a subsequent enquiry) that their financial dependence on the client, consultancy work or 
desire to maintain the long-term relationship did not interfere with their independence of judgement 
and degree of scrutiny in their audit work. Indeed, similar tensions were also present in Suddaby and 
Greenwood’s (2005) analysis of the arguments for multi-disciplinary partnerships, where the PSFs 
                                                          
10 The notion of orders of worth also has connections with Suddaby and Greenwood’s (2005: 42) notion from 
institutional theory of “institutional logics” – albeit the former referring to methods of justification and the 
latter referring to a wider set of values and practices used to guide conduct in an institutional field. 
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argued that the commercial benefits of partnerships would not interfere with their professional 
integrity and independence.  
While Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) examine the rhetorical strategies used by PSFs to 
legitimate or de-legitimate change in the institutional field, what we add here is a way of 
understanding how contests around particular professional claims (e.g. claims to being independent 
or avoiding conflicts of interest) are played out through the exposure of reality disjunctures (viewed 
as processes of de-legitimation), and attempts to ‘resolve’ them (viewed as processes of re-
legitimation). As Empson et al. (2015: 5) point out, for the Big Four in particular, any claim to a 
separation of the two orders of worth are likely to be problematic given the fact that the same firm 
can contain both “the highly regulated audit function (where an auditor’s first duty is to uphold the 
public interest)” and “the management consulting function (where a consultant’s first duty is to his or 
her client)”. We go further by showing how any such claims to be “upholding a duty” to any 
stakeholder (or indeed any other professional ideal or value) are socially constructed through 
discourse, rather than viewing these as ‘objective’ attributes of any particular professional task or 
organizational structure. 
What is more, the unique contribution of our study is to illuminate not only contests between 
these two competing orders of worth of ‘profession’ and ‘commerce’. Our study has also uncovered 
contests within these orders of worth, namely, contests about the precise meaning of abstract ideas 
and ideals such as ‘competition’ and ‘audit’. In the inquiry we have studied, discursive contests took 
place around: (1) what a competitive market is (what Boltanski and Thévenot call the ‘market’ order 
of worth) and (2) what a professional audit is (professionalism is subsumed by Boltanski and Thévenot 
within the ‘industrial’ order of worth11). Thus, we have shown that simple appeals to commonly used 
terms and phrases associated with professionalism (such as notions of ‘expert judgement’, ‘truth’ or 
‘public good’) and markets (such as notions of ‘competition’ or ‘profit maximisation’), are not in 
themselves legitimation tactics. Rather, processes of legitimation take place through the contests 
around what the proper theoretical definitions of these terms should be. For instance, our study has 
revealed contests around whether a competitive market is one in which buyers have the choice to 
switch or one in which they exercise this choice by switching providers. We have also shown the 
contests around whether an audit involves an assessment of the accuracy of financial records or the 
financial viability of a business. Even the definition of what constitutes ‘conflict of interest’ was 
                                                          
11 Arguably, however, professions requires further differentiation in Boltanski and Thévenot’s theory, given the 
fact that notions of ‘professional’ and ‘professionalism’ appeal not only to ideals of having specialist expertise 
and maximizing technical efficiency (associated with industry) but also ideals around civic duty and public good 
(Abbott, 1988; Empson, et al., 2015). Hence, we would prefer to use the term ‘professional logic’ or 
‘professional order of worth’ rather than ‘industrial order of worth’. 
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discursively contested – with influential scholars such as Professor Power (see above) also holding 
different theories of whether offering audit services alongside consultancy services constitutes a 
concern. Importantly, these are not merely semantic battles over the proper use of terminology. These 
contests also have far-reaching implications for the governance and regulation of professional service 
firms – a point we will explain in more detail in the conclusion next. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has studied the scrutiny placed on the Big Four audit firms in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. The central objective of our paper was to understand how the profession has handled the threat 
to their legitimacy in the light of their apparent failure in the auditing of banks, as well as long-standing 
concerns about competitiveness and conflicts of interest in the profession (Thornburg & Roberts, 
2008; Moore et al, 2006). The paper has focused on the testimony of the Big Four to a British 
parliamentary inquiry by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee (the Committee). The very 
fact that such an inquiry was deemed necessary indicates that legitimacy was under public scrutiny. 
For this purpose, we built on Alexander (2011: 81) who expressed a double-edged tension in that 
“social power be justified and that authority be accountable, but one also must acknowledge that 
even the most democratic and individuated societies depend on performative abilities to sustain 
collective belief.” A different way of saying this is to argue that professions need to achieve not only 
legitimacy and accountability, but also performative effectiveness, such as the ability to defend audit, 
as well as conduct it, in a manner deemed to be competent.   
We agree that “… social order is negotiated on an ongoing basis, and legitimacy is achieved 
through public debate among competent agents. In fragmented and contested institutional 
environments, the harmonious arrangement of things and persons is always ‘up for grabs’” (Patriotta 
et al, 2011: 1806). Sustaining a shared collective belief – such as belief in the efficacy and ethics of 
auditors - therefore necessitates accounts to be made that uphold audit as a legitimate means of 
generating accountability. Our paper has provided an Ethnomethodologically-informed Discourse 
Analysis (EDA) of the arguments used to defend the audit profession to an audience of political 
representatives tasked with critically scrutinising the accountancy profession. We have shown that 
scrutiny was performed by the Committee by exposing reality disjunctures in the Big Four’s accounts 
– contrasts between “what they claim” and “what is (or was) the case”. We have also shown that the 
Big Four attempted to resolve these disjunctures, and restore their legitimacy, by putting forward 
candidate resolutions to these disjunctures. It was through the interaction of these methods of 
scrutinizing legitimacy, and the methods for restoring it, that the “facts” about the state of the 
profession were established. 
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Why do interactions such as these matter? They matter because it is these interactional 
‘mechanics’ that establish the ‘facts’ upon which important decisions about the future of the 
profession are established. Just like judges, as Pollner (1987: Ch. 2) himself studied, inquiries cannot 
just sit on the fence or fail to resolve competing accounts. Their institutional role is to take conflicting 
accounts and ‘sort them out’ – that is, “produce a determinate version of ‘what really happened’.” 
(Pollner, 1987: xii, see also Gephart, 1984). For example, a judge has to decide if the defendant is guilty 
or innocent from the competing accounts put forward by the prosecution and defense. In such 
institutional settings, there cannot be multiple realities, only one (which may, of course, later be 
revised e.g. by an appeal court or higher court). Therefore, just like judges, the job of the Committee 
was to decide whether the audit profession was working well or not, and if not to recommend what 
should be done about it. Most notably in our case this latter question could include referral to 
government and regulators who have the power to intervene in the audit market, should they be 
persuaded that it is necessary and beneficial (Ball, 2009; Cooper & Robson, 2006) – a point we will 
return to shortly.  
It is well established that inquiries do not take place out of ‘general interest’, but are rather 
the product of seeking answers to a pressing problem, to find a culprit or a ritualised process to sanitise 
the status quo (Kertzer, 1988: 107-110; Brown, 2000, 2004, 2005). The immediate fall-out from the 
global financial crisis looked at explanations such as the lack of regulation, bankers’ bonuses and the 
role of the credit agencies and mark-to-market accounting amongst others (Davies, 2010; Stiglitz, 
2010: 156). The House of Lords inquiry into the Big Four marked the second phase of sensemaking 
into the global financial crisis, the first phase having focussed on the prime protagonists such as the 
failed banks and credit reference agencies (Hargie, Stapleton & Tourish, 2010; Whittle & Mueller, 
2012). From the perspective of institutional legitimacy and trust in their profession (Mueller, Carter & 
Whittle, 2015), it was clearly an inquiry the Big Four had to take seriously. Some of the questions posed 
during the Committee hearing were by no means new or surprising: mandatory audit firm rotation, 
for example, has been discussed in the accounting literature for some time (e.g. Arruñada, 2004). 
Arruñada strongly argued against it on the basis that it “makes audits more costly because it increases 
production costs and reduces competition in the marketplace” (p.640). Instead of mandatory rotation, 
he identifies harmful regulations as “the real culprits of the current situation”, most seriously the 
regulation “that obliges large firms or listed companies to audit their accounts” (ibid)12. While these 
questions were certainly amongst those the Committee sought to address, the more fundamental 
question was whether there was indeed some “problem” to be addressed in the first place.  
                                                          
12 Some of these theoretical arguments and justifications would have been known to the respondents and, potentially 
even to the questioners.   
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Our analysis of the reality disjunctures and associated methods of resolution has shown that 
the inquiry was not only a mechanism for producing the ‘truth’ of what happened in the auditing of 
the banks and the ‘fact’ of the state of competition in the UK audit market, but also a struggle for 
meaning over the nature of expertise, including what audit is and is not (Power, 1997a,b). Miller and 
Rose (2008: 109) refer to “(s)truggles over the regulation of expertise” in a range of new forums 
including commissions and committees, which “render the actions and judgments of professionals 
governable in new ways”. Indeed, the Committee questioned the premise of the Big Four’s standard 
operating practices and expressed their incredulity at some of the established practices. Such public 
displays of incredulity are not merely ‘for show’, but are often performative13: the public displays of 
scepticism, incredulity and disbelief performed through the exposure of reality disjunctures served to 
question the faith that could be placed in the accounts of the Big Four. 
In our analysis, we were struck by the disjunctures in constituting the accepted account of the 
auditors’ role in the financial crisis and their current status as an oligopolistic market. For instance, the 
Heads of the Big Four asserted that the legitimacy of the Big Four has never been lost, while the Lords 
were apparently keen to undermine the claim that the Big Four have no case to answer. Thus, the 
questions and answers were a process in which claim and counter-claim were made in order for the 
Committee to establish verisimilitude about the precise role of the Big Four in the global financial 
crisis. This is a comparable case of distributed governance as the contested rebuilding of ‘Ground Zero’ 
examined by Hajer (2009), where a range of events were “to result in the sequence of staged 
performances that is, eventually, supposed to produce a legitimate decision” (p. 109). Participants in 
this process make sense of it by looking forward to (i.e. prospecting) the potential outcome. In our 
case, this outcome was an authoritative account about the auditor’s role in society and a set of 
recommendations for changes to the profession.  
It is important to recognize that the focus of our analysis is on what the talk that was analysed 
actually does, that is, which version of reality will enter the official account and also what that official 
account will be used to do or decide – what Potter (1996) emphasises as the social actions that are 
performed by discourse - in short its performativity. Hajer (2009: 135), for instance, discusses how in 
the context of the BSE scare, governmental attempts at spin and delivering paternalistic messages 
backfired, “eroded public confidence and led to general distrust.” The accounts in the inquiry we have 
examined are consequential, in our case, for the legitimacy of the profession more generally and 
consequential also more specifically for the possibility of state intervention in the field. Accepting the 
theory of competition-as-high-switching, for instance, leads policy makers towards the conclusion 
                                                          
13 In the Nixon hearings, for instance, “their use of highly charged political symbolism, and their emotional quality, 
provided an effective means for divesting Nixon of his authority.” (Kertzer, 1988: 28). 
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that, if competition is artificially low, intervention in the market may be necessary to make the so-
called ‘invisible hand’ of the market operate properly. In the case of the audit industry, this could have 
taken a number of forms, from the compulsory break-up of the Big Four to the mandatory pairing of 
the Big Four with second-tier firms. By ratifying a particular account as reality, certain options or 
alternatives are silenced and certain courses of action are instead privileged, albeit without clearly 
identifiable causal relationships.  
What, then, did the Committee we have studied conclude? The final written report produced 
by the Committee largely dismissed the versions put forward by the Big Four14. More specifically, the 
report rejects their claims that the audit industry is highly competitive, has no conflicts of interest and 
performed their proper duty in the auditing of the banks. The consequences of this political act of 
‘making reality’ (Gephart, 1984) can therefore be traced in the reforms in the accountancy profession 
that have since been implemented. The consequences of this Committee judgement were indeed 
profound. The Committee recommended that competition in the audit market was sufficiently 
problematic to pass it to the UK Office of Fair Trading, who in turn deemed the situation problematic 
enough to warrant a full inquiry by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (formerly the 
Competition Commission), the regulatory body responsible for ensuring free and fair competition and 
reducing anti-competitive activities. The CMA report concluded that: 
“there are features of the [audit] market or markets which, either alone or in combination, 
 prevent, restrict or distort competition in connection with the supply of statutory 
 audit services to large companies in the UK”15 
 In September 2014, the CMA announced their new regulations (the “CMA Order”) governing 
the UK audit market16. A raft of regulatory changes were put in place: Firms would no longer be 
permitted to limit those who bid for its audit work to just the Big Four accountancy firms. Mandatory 
tendering was also introduced, forcing major UK-listed companies to allow accountancy firms to bid 
for their audit work every 10 years.17 It is also noteworthy that similar reforms have been implemented 
at the European level by the European Commission, in the form of a new EU regulatory framework on 
statutory audit, due to come into force in 201618. These new measures, which include enhancing the 
independence of auditors, increasing the level of scrutiny in the audit report and increasing audit 
supervision, have been driven by similar concerns about the professional integrity and independence 
                                                          
14 Source: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/economic-affairs-
committee/inquiries/auditors-market-concentration-and-their-role/  
15 Source: The Statutory Audit Services for Large Companies Market Investigation (Mandatory Use of 
Competitive Tender Processes and Audit Committee Responsibilities) Order 2014 https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/54252eae40f0b61342000bb4/The_Order.pdf  
16 The CMA Order came into effect on 1st January 2015. 
17 Source: https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/54252eae40f0b61342000bb4/The_Order.pdf  
18 Source: Directive 2014/56/EU amending Directive 2006/43/EC. 
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of the big players. Mirroring the concerns expressed in this inquiry, concerns were voiced at European 
level specifically about “excessive familiarity between statutory auditors and their clients”, 
“professional scepticism” and “conflicts of interest”19.  
The point of our EDA perspective is not to lay claim to a direct causal relationship between, 
say, unconvincing rhetorical performances by the Big Four representatives on the one hand, and 
reforms that get initiated on the other hand. Many social processes are undoubtedly involved in such 
governance and regulation systems. Claiming such direct causality is also rooted in positivistic thinking 
and is in direct contravention to the core ideas of social constructionist research (Silverman, 2014). 
What is clear, though, is that failure to reject the definition of the situation of audit as “an un-
competitive market” and the profession as exhibiting “a failure in audit standards” set the backdrop 
for the inquiries and reforms that followed, both at UK and EU levels. These were the “agreed facts” 
and “authoritative versions of reality” upon which attempts at regulation were premised. The aim of 
our EDA analysis, then, was to reveal how these facts and versions of reality are discursively produced. 
Thus, our EDA approach also links to existing work by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005), Pentland 
(1993), Hajer (2009: 107-9), Alexander (2011: 68-70) and Ramirez (2013) in linking rhetorical micro 
performances to broader, meso and macro, considerations regarding professional legitimacy – in our 
case by tracing how apparently minor discursive moves during a parliamentary hearing set the scene 
for more far-reaching macro changes in the institutional field. The implications for professions are 
significant. As we have shown, reality disjunctures that are (ex)posed in such “field-configuring 
events” (McInerney, 2008) can question the claims of professional ideals, values and standards and 
therefore invite new forms of regulation or intervention.  
 
                                                          
19 Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-427_en.htm?locale=en  
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Table 1: Contrast Structures, Reality Disjunctures and Methods of Resolution in the House of Lords EconomicAffairs Select Committee hearing (23rd November 2010) 
 
 
 Given (X)  We would expect 
(Y) 
How do you account for (Z)? 
(the “reality disjuncture”) 
Candidate methods for reality disjuncture resolution 
Q244 Lord 
Forsyth of 
Drumlean 
Your claim that the 
audit market is 
highly competitive. 
 
There would be a 
high level of 
‘switching’ 
between firms. 
 
The fact that switching rates are 
so low. 
The Theoretical Method  
Griffith-Jones claims that low switching rates are not, in fact, evidence of a lack of 
competition. He claims that clients are choosing not to exercise the option of 
tendering – either because the auditor resolves any problems before it goes to 
tender, or because the audit team is itself rotated frequently, thereby building ‘churn’ 
into the system already. The candidate solution offered to resolve the disjuncture is 
differing theories of competition: according to the Big 4, long-lasting relations 
between buyer and supplier need not indicate the absence of ‘competition’. The 
‘facts’ of low switching rates are not disputed, but rather what those facts indicate 
about the theoretical concept ‘competition’.  
Q252  
Lord 
Hollick 
That your firms 
provide advisory 
services on taxation 
and tax planning. 
That the same 
accounting firm 
would not conduct 
the audit given the 
conflict of interest. 
The fact that your firm also 
audits the same companies it 
offers these advisory services 
to. 
The Factual Method  
Powell attempts to resolve the disjuncture by claiming that this ‘fact’ (Z) is actually 
‘fiction’: Z has never actually occurred because they would not be allowed (by their 
independence rules and the client firm’s audit committees), or allow themselves 
(through notions of professionalism), to be in this situation. As such, the questioners 
are deemed to be talking about a hypothetical event. 
Q280  
Lord 
Lipsey 
Your firms signed 
off the banks as a 
“going concern”. 
That the banks can 
“pay their debts as 
they fall due”. 
The fact that the banks needed 
a government bail-out in order 
to repay their debts. 
The Temporal Method  
Powell states that the objects to which the two accounts refer – the ‘going concern’ 
audit opinion – are not the same objects: one is the opinion now post-crisis, with-the-
benefit-of-hindsight, and the object to which he is referring was then, pre-crisis. 
Q274 Lord 
Forsyth of 
Drumlean 
The kinds of growth 
and lending 
practices of the 
banks. 
There to be ‘alarm 
bells’ sounded by 
auditors. 
The fact that no ‘alarm bells’ 
were sounded. 
The Temporal Method  
Griffith-Jones implies that while he would agree a “going concern” audit opinion 
would be regarded as erroneous in 2010 (the year of the inquiry), it was not 
erroneous in 2007-8 because information available now was not available then. The 
disjuncture is handled through the creation of two different referents: audit-opinion-
now-with-hindsight and audit-opinion-then-without-hindsight.  
The Theoretical Method  
In his second response, Griffith-Jones attempts to resolve the disjuncture by putting 
forward another alternative referent – the theory of what an ‘audit’ is. The reason for 
the disjuncture, then, is because they are not talking about an identical object. 
